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COST OF ADMISSION: ONE RUBBER STAMP – EVALUATING THE  
SIGNIFICANCE OF INVESTIGATIVE NECESSITY IN WIRETAP 
AUTHORIZATIONS AFTER R. V. ARAUJO 
Jim Cruess* 
Introduction 
Between 2000 and 2011, Canadian courts denied 4 of 1358 wiretap1 requests.2 
Such near universal authorization of wiretap requests suggests something is wrong.  
The application of sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code,3 two provisions 
that govern the authorization and renewal of audio wiretaps,4 should reflect both a 
practical and a policy-based purpose. From a practical perspective, the application 
of “investigative necessity”—a statutory requirement that the requesting govern-
ment body demonstrate that other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed 
in order to authorize most wiretaps5—should distinguish wiretap requests from 
much less privacy-invasive warranted searches of property. From a policy perspec-
tive, sections 185–186, in part through the application of investigative necessity, 
should properly balance the privacy interests of Canadian residents with the 
Crown’s interest in the effective investigation and prosecution of crime. As pres-
ently drafted and applied, sections 185–186 are failing to reflect both of these 
purposes. 
                                                                                                                                                         
* Jim Cruess completed his J.D. at the University of British Columbia. He also holds a B.A. from McGill 
University. He would like to thank the editors and faculty reviewer for their helpful comments. All 
views expressed are those of the author alone. 
 
1 For the purposes of this article, the term wiretap will be used to describe all forms of prospective inter-
ception of communications, including some which do not require proof of investigative necessity such 
as video surveillance authorized under a general warrant pursuant to s 487.01 of the Criminal Code, RSC 
1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].  
2 Annual Report on the Use of Electronic Surveillance 2005 (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2006) [2005 
Report]; Annual Report on the Use of Electronic Surveillance 2010 (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2011) 
at 7 [2010 Report]; Annual Report on the Use of Electronic Surveillance 2011 (Ottawa: Public Safety 
Canada, 2012) at 5 [2011 Report]. 
3 Criminal Code, supra note 1.  
4 Audio wiretaps are the most common means by which police forces are authorized to intercept private 
communications. The only other common form of intercept requested is video under a general warrant 
by operation of s 487.01 of the Criminal Code, supra note 1. 
5 This is not technically the only means by which a requesting State party can prove investigative neces-
sity under s 186 of the Criminal Code, supra note 1. However, in practice, it is the determinative factor: 
see Part I. 
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For decades, wiretaps have been instrumental in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of all manner of criminals including murderers6 and members of complex 
criminal networks such as drug trafficking rings.7 Intercepted communications 
between alleged offenders provide highly reliable information that can, among oth-
er things, identify members of criminal organizations, implicate targets in criminal 
activity, and support the conviction of criminals.  
While this technology can be an effective investigative tool, it can also facilitate 
unnecessary large-scale breaches of the privacy of targeted individuals and their 
associates, friends, and families. Wiretaps are indiscriminate in the communica-
tions they record. A wiretap will intercept and record an innocent conversation 
with a loved one just as it will record the discussion of a large-scale drug transfer. 
This indiscriminate privacy infringement is why the Criminal Code must carefully 
circumscribe government use of wiretaps. Without effectively enforced limits and 
preconditions for the use of wiretaps, privacy will be eroded into a meaningless 
value. Justice La Forest, for the majority in R v Duarte, aptly summarized this risk: 
[T]he very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it has the po-
tential, if left unregulated to annihilate any expectation that our 
communications will remain private. A society which exposed us, at the 
whim of the State to the risk of having a permanent electronic recording 
made of our words every time we opened our mouths might be superbly 
equipped to fight crime, but would be one in which privacy no longer 
had any meaning.8 
The Criminal Code primarily protects privacy from unnecessary wiretap sur-
veillance by requiring the requesting body to satisfy a member of the judiciary that 
the following criteria are met before receiving authorization for most wiretaps:9  
(i) there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence10 has been or is 
being committed;11 (ii) the authorization sought will afford evidence of that of-
fence;12 and (iii) investigative necessity is established.13 In essence, the 
establishment of investigative necessity is the mechanism that justifies a wiretap’s 
increased infringement of a target’s (and his or her associates’) privacy interests 
relative to a search of property in favour of the Crown's interest in the effective 
investigation of crime. 
Authorizing and reviewing judges are best positioned to maintain the right bal-
ance between privacy and investigative interests. It follows that in order to strike an 
appropriate balance, not only must a judge authorize proposed wiretaps, but he or 
                                                                                                                                                         
6 See for example: R v Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851. 
7 See for example: R v Mahal, 2012 ONCA 673 [Mahal]. 
8 R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30 at para 22 [Duarte]. 
9 Some types of wiretap such as consent wiretaps (Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 184.2), in which one 
party to the private communication consents to the interception, do not require proof of investigative 
necessity. The privacy implications of consent wiretaps are less problematic, as the consenting party 
essentially waives his or her privacy under those circumstances. 
10 The term ‘offence’ refers only to those offences listed in s 183 of the Criminal Code, supra note 1. 
11 Duarte, supra note 8 interpreting the Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 186(1)(a) which requires that the 
authorization “would be in the best interests of the administration of justice.” 
12 Ibid. 
13 Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 186(1)(b). 
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she must be willing to reject authorization requests due to the failure to show in-
vestigative necessity in the name of privacy over investigative interests in some 
circumstances.  
The additional investigative necessity requirement for authorization of wiretaps 
is both logical and necessary when the effects of wiretaps are considered against 
those of normal searches of property. First, as noted, unlike normal search war-
rants which seize evidence in one location at one point in time, wiretaps record all 
incoming and outgoing information “like a huge vacuum cleaner, indiscriminately 
sucking in the relevant with the irrelevant without distinction”14 for between 60 
and over 240 days.15 To put the effect on privacy in perspective, in one recent case, 
police intercepted 14,000 communications, of which 83 were deemed relevant and 
16 were sought to be admitted as evidence at trial.16 This massive acquisition of 
information also violates the privacy of innocent third parties who associate with 
the target(s) of wiretaps. Second, unlike normal search warrants, wiretaps depend 
on the absence of notice of the information acquisition to the target in order to 
succeed. The intercept target is not informed of the wiretap until after its comple-
tion.17  
Like search warrant authorizations, wiretap authorization hearings are per-
formed ex parte. No party represents the interests of the target(s). The authorizing 
judge must make a decision based only on a police affidavit and questions put to 
the affiant. This creates a substantial risk of unfairness or abuse.18 It follows that in 
order to mitigate that risk, the investigative necessity requirement must both be 
legislatively applicable to a given wiretap request and effectively applied by the ju-
diciary in order to balance privacy and investigative interests. 
Prior to 2000, investigative necessity was not applied robustly. Wiretap requests 
were nearly universally authorized.19 In 2000, the Supreme Court of Canada in  
R v Araujo sought to revitalize investigative necessity and strike a fair balance be-
tween privacy and investigative interests. The Court found that investigative 
necessity is not met solely because a wiretap is most efficacious,20 but a wiretap 
does not need to be a tactic of last resort.21 Justice LeBel, speaking on behalf of a 
unanimous Court, held that “[t]he judge should not view himself or herself as a 
mere rubber stamp”; rather, he or she should take a close look at the material sub-
mitted by the applicant to determine if there is “practically speaking, no other 
reasonable alternative method of investigation, in the circumstances of the particu-
lar criminal inquiry.”22  
                                                                                                                                                         
14 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Electronic Surveillance (Ottawa: Working Paper 47, 1986) at 34. 
15 2010 Report, supra note 2 at 7. 
16 R v Spackman (2008), 234 CCC (3d) 24 (Ont SCJ) at para 2. 
17 In some cases, such as organized crime wiretap authorizations for investigations of offences under  
ss 467.11, 467.12, and 467.13 of the Criminal Code, notice may be delayed even further after the end of 
monitoring: see Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 196(5). 
18 R v Bogiatzis (2003), 108 CRR (2d) 294 at paras 10-15 (Ont SCJ). 
19 See for discussion: Francois Valeriote, “Judicial Authorization for Wiretap: An Illusory Protection” 
(1980) 12 Ottawa L Rev 215 at 216. 
20 R v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65 at para 39 [Araujo]. 
21 Ibid at paras 34-35. Also affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Schreinert (2002), 165 CCC 
(3d) 295 at 305 (Ont CA) [Schreinert]. 
22 Araujo, supra note 20 at para 29. 
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This article seeks to determine whether Araujo, as applied by the courts over 
the last thirteen years, did in fact strike a fair balance between Canada’s investiga-
tive interests and the privacy interests of its residents in sections 185-186 wiretap 
authorizations and reviews.23 Does it impose a sufficiently high standard to author-
ize privacy-invasive wiretaps relative to traditional searches? On my evaluation, it 
does neither. Thus, one must also ask: how can its role be reformed to better bal-
ance Canadian citizens’ privacy with the State’s interest in the effective 
investigation of crimes?  
The article will proceed in four parts. In Part I, it will briefly define investigative 
necessity as it has been interpreted by Canadian case law, noting similarities to 
wiretap law in the United States and United Kingdom. In Part II, it will examine 
how investigative necessity has been legislated out of significance in the investiga-
tion of some crimes under the Criminal Code. Specifically, it looks at legislated 
exceptions in which investigative necessity need not be proven and the ramifica-
tions of those exceptions. In Part III, it will examine the application of Araujo 
based on wiretap authorization statistics and wiretap review jurisprudence since 
2000. This analysis will show that investigative necessity as currently applied has 
little to no effect on the authorization or denial of wiretap requests and their ad-
mission as evidence at trial. I assert that courts are unnecessarily favouring the 
State’s interest in criminal investigation and prosecution over the privacy of Cana-
dian residents by failing to apply the investigative necessity requirement in the way 
the Supreme Court intended in Araujo. Finally, Part IV will conclude and propose 
some preliminary reforms. I suggest that in order to properly balance privacy and 
investigative interests, changes need only ensure that (i) investigative necessity is 
always applied for wiretap authorizations, and (ii) investigative necessity is applied 
in a manner that ensures authorization requests are rejected on the failure to 
demonstrate it. These proposed reforms seek to ensure that the application of in-
vestigative necessity protects the privacy of Canadians from unnecessary 
surveillance and serves as more than a “rubber stamp” requirement. 
I. The Meaning of Investigative Necessity 
Investigative necessity can be met by any one of three disjunctive grounds listed 
in subsection 186(1)(b) of the Code, namely that: 
(i) Other investigative procedures have been tried and failed;  
(ii) Other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed; or  
(iii) The urgency of the matter is such that it would be impractical to carry 
out the investigation of the offence using only other investigative proce-
dures.24 
                                                                                                                                                         
23 One commentator argued that the Court did not go far enough in Araujo. He argues that despite its 
apparently strong language, Araujo represents only an aspirational statement of the law with no real 
effect on wiretap authorizations or admission of wiretaps into evidence at trial: Nathan Forester, “Elec-
tronic Surveillance, Criminal Investigations, and the Erosion of Constitutional Rights in Canada: 
Regressive U-Turn or a Mere Bump in the Road Towards Charter Justice” (2010) 73 Sask L Rev 23 at 66. 
24 R v Smyk (1993), 86 CCC (3d) 63 at 70 (Man CA). 
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In practice, only one ground is regularly contended: that other investigative 
procedures are unlikely to succeed. Police need not prove the first ground—that all 
other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed—because the Supreme Court 
in Araujo held that investigative necessity is not a test of last resort.25 The third 
ground, urgency, is rarely argued because historically police could obtain an emer-
gency wiretap under section 188 without proving investigative necessity if the 
situation truly needed expeditious investigation.26 Thus, the determination of 
whether no other reasonable alternative methods of investigation exist will usually 
hinge on whether methods that were not tried were unlikely to succeed. 
In determining whether other reasonable methods of investigation exist, the au-
thorizing judge must evaluate the request based on the objective of the 
investigation.27 For example, while planting an undercover officer close to a sus-
pected drug trafficker may gather evidence against that trafficker, it may not be a 
reasonable investigative tactic to identify the leaders of the trafficking ring and ac-
quire evidence of their guilt.28  
The authorizing judge must also consider the risks and realities associated with 
other means of investigation.29 Thus, the investigation of some crimes, such as drug 
trafficking, may preclude otherwise reasonable practices, such as the use of an un-
dercover officer or police agent, because trafficking groups can be expected to 
employ counter-intelligence and violence to avoid police detection.30 
Finally, investigative necessity must be considered with regard to the investiga-
tion as a whole, rather than evaluated as it concerns each named person in the 
authorization request.31 Thus, an accused cannot successfully argue that the police 
should have executed a search warrant on his or her house, rather than seek a wire-
tap, if the search would not lead to evidence against other members of the drug-
trafficking ring.32 
The Canadian investigative necessity requirement is similar in form to the re-
quirement in force in the United Kingdom, which says that the Secretary of State33 
must consider “whether the information which is thought necessary to obtain un-
der the warrant could reasonably be obtained by other means.34  
In the United States, the necessity required to authorize wiretaps is also similar-
ly worded, requiring that normal investigative procedures have been tried and have 
                                                                                                                                                         
25 Araujo, supra note 20 at para 29. 
26 This provision was struck down in 2012 by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Tse, 2012 SCC 16. 
The Court held that s 184.4 of the Criminal Code violated the s 8 Charter right against unreasonable 
search or seizure because it did not provide a mechanism for oversight or notice to the person whose 
communications were intercepted. The breach could not be saved by s 1. However, the Court made 
clear that an emergency wiretap provision could be valid under s 8 in exigent circumstances. Thus, in 
future, police will likely retain a similar power when a new emergency wiretap provision is legislated 
27 Araujo, supra note 20 at para 43; R v Paris (2006), 208 OAC 385 at para 17 (CA) [Paris]. 
28 See for example R v Adam, 2006 BCSC 382 at paras 137-140 [Adam]. 
29 R v Wasfi, 2006 BCCA 55 at para 49 [Wasfi]. 
30 Ibid. 
31 R v Pham, 2002 BCCA 247 at para 85 [Pham] citing R v Tahirkheli (1998), 130 CCC (3d) 19 at 22 (Ont 
CA); Mahal, supra note 7. 
32 Pham, supra note 32 at para 43. 
33 In the UK, the Secretary of State and his or her delegated agents are responsible for wiretap authoriza-
tions, rather than a judge.  
34 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), 2000, c 23, s 5(4). 
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failed, reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or are too dangerous.35 
However, in the United States, the requesting body must establish necessity in or-
der to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment protecting against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.36 
Section 8 of the Charter,37 unlike the United States’ Fourth Amendment, does 
not mandate proof of investigative necessity in order to authorize wiretaps.38 This 
fact is reflected in the diminished significance of investigative necessity in the Ca-
nadian Criminal Code since sections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) entered into force. 
II. Diminished Significance of Investigate Necessity in the Criminal Code 
Investigative necessity no longer must be proven to authorize all section 186 
wiretaps. Sections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) now state that investigative necessity need 
not be proven to authorize a wiretap for the investigation of (i) terrorism offences, 
(ii) offences committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a 
criminal organization, or (iii) offences under sections 467.11-467.13 of the Code. 
Trial and appellate courts across Canada have held these exceptions to be constitu-
tionally valid.39 The practical effect of these exceptions on wiretap authorizations is 
significant. In essence, they have relegated investigative necessity to insignificance 
in many of the cases in which wiretaps are traditionally sought.40 
Parliament legislated that investigative necessity need not be proven for offenc-
es associated with criminal organizations in 1997.41 The criminal organization 
provisions took their current form by amendment in 200142 due to a concern that 
the 1997 definition of ‘criminal organization’ was too narrow and thus easily 
avoided by criminals.43 The result was a broader definition that allows police to 
more easily wiretap organized groups of suspected criminals. The terrorism excep-
tion was also added in 2001.44 Both the first criminal organization and the anti-
terrorism amending statutes note in their preambles that the challenges of combat-
ing and deterring these activities require an enhanced capacity to investigate them. 
Each also came on the heels of a significant criminal event that caused public out-
                                                                                                                                                         
35 Title III, 18 USC s 2518(3)(c). 
36 Confirmed by LeBel J. in Araujo, supra note 20 at para 32. Also see DF Cook, “Electronic Surveillance, 
Title III, and the Requirement of Necessity,” (1973) 2 Hast CLQ 571. 
37 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
38 R v Largie, 2010 ONCA 548 [Largie]; R v SAB, [2003] 2 SCR 678. 
39 R v Doiron, 2007 NBCA 41 at paras 43-46, leave to appeal to SCC refused [2007] SCCA No 413; R v 
Lucas, 2009 CanLII 27835 (Ont SCJ); R v NY, 2008 CanLII 15908 (Ont SCJ); R v Pangman, [2000] 8 
WWR 536 at 551-561 (Man QB). 
40 A substantial amount (from 2006-2010, approx. 20% conservatively) wiretap authorizations arise in 
terrorism or organized crime cases with multiple perpetrators. See below for discussion. 
41 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal organizations) and to amend other Acts in consequence, 
SC 1997, c 23, s 6. 
42 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and law enforcement) and to make consequential 
amendments to other Acts, SC 2001, c 32, s 6. 
43 R v Terezakis, 2007 BCCA 384 at para 9 [Terezakis]. 
44 Anti-terrorism Act, SC 2001, c 41, s 6.1. 
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cry45 and ‘moral panic’.46 First was the fear of organized crime in the wake of a gang 
war; next was the fear of terrorism after 9/11. These moral panics resulted in a leg-
islative ratcheting effect, such that the barriers to authorizing a wiretap were 
incrementally removed in response to a collective moment of fear. The moral panic 
eventually subsided, but the changes remained. As a result, wiretaps are authorized 
in the same way as a traditional search for anyone about whom there are reasona-
ble and probable grounds to believe he or she is committing one of the types of 
offences listed in sections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1). When a wiretap can be authorized 
on the same grounds as a search of property, why would the police tip their hand to 
the target with a traditional search and its notice requirements? The same grounds 
can allow for greater information acquisition (with concomitant greater privacy 
infringement). Nowhere is this exception of more concern than in the investigation 
of offences committed in violation of sections 467.11, 467.12, and 467.13 of the 
Criminal Code.47 
The provisions of sections 467.11-467.13 create a hierarchy of offences associat-
ed with criminal organizations.48 Participating in or contributing to any activity of 
a criminal organization for the purpose of enhancing its ability to commit crimes 
(section 467.11) bears the lowest stigma; committing an indictable offence for the 
benefit of such an organization (section 467.12) is more serious; and instructing a 
person to commit an offence for the benefit of a criminal organization (section 
467.13) is the most serious. The effect of the legislative immunity from proving 
investigative necessity with regard to these offences is strongest with regard to sec-
tion 467.11. 
Under section 467.1 of the Criminal Code, a criminal organization must (i) be 
composed of three or more people in or outside Canada, (ii) have as one of its main 
purposes or main activities, the facilitation or commission of one or more serious 
offences49, and (iii) likely gain a material benefit from the commission of such seri-
ous offence(s), or such a benefit is gained by at least one of its members.50 The 
                                                                                                                                                         
45 The organized crime legislation was passed on the eve of a federal election around which time the 
Quebec Attorney General issued a plea for new measures to address a violent and protracted fight be-
tween the Hell’s Angels and Rock Machine in Quebec, which had recently resulted in the death of an 
innocent young boy on a public street from a bomb blast (D Stuart, “Politically Expedient But Potential-
ly Unjust Criminal Legislation against Gants,” Alan D Gold Collection of Criminal Law Articles, 
ADGN/RP-056 (1997) (Law Society of Upper Canada Session on Criminal Law and the Charter, Sep-
tember 27, 1997), and Colloquium on Organized Crime, International Association of Penal Law in 
Egypt, November 1997 at paras 3-7). The other came months after September 11, 2001, a date on which  
al-Qaeda operatives launched four coordinated terror attacks against the United States. 
46 A moral panic is a time in which “[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to be-
come defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politi-
cians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and 
solutions; ways of coping are evolved (or more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, sub-
merges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.” Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The 
Creation of the Mods and the Rockers (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972) at 9. 
47 Criminal Code, supra note 1. 
48 Terezakis, supra note 44 at para 11 citing Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 467.1. 
49 A serious offence is defined as an indictable offence with a maximum punishment of five or more 
years in prison. 
50 Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 467.1. 
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criminal organization cannot form randomly.51 The Supreme Court of Canada in  
R v Venneri determined that a flexible approach to this definition is appropriate, 
but made clear that the term “organized,” connoting some degree of structure and 
coordination, limits the scope of groups to which the definition can be applied.52 
The problem with this definition of criminal organization with regard to wire-
tap authorizations is its breadth. Practically, for police to dodge the obligation to 
prove investigative necessity, they need only show that the target is “associated” 
with a criminal organization. Some offences such as drug trafficking are regularly 
perpetrated by an organized group of at least three people in which at least one 
member stands to benefit. A close association with such a group may show reason-
able and probable grounds that a person contributes to that organization for the 
purpose of enhancing its ability to commit crime. Thus, an innocent party’s mere 
association with this kind of group may open him or her up to the large-scale ac-
quisition of personal information by the State based only on the elements of a 
normal search warrant.53 The breadth of individuals to whom section 467.11 opens 
wiretap investigation seriously decreases the privacy protection provided by inves-
tigative necessity to criminally innocent parties from surveillance or to people who 
would otherwise only be subject to a less invasive search of property. 
A Member of Parliament argued this erosion of privacy was necessary in order 
to “relieve police officers of a paper burden.”54 That Member supported making the 
change “because when investigating organized crime, it is almost always obvious 
that [wiretapping] is a last resort.”55 Thus, investigative necessity, which was in-
tended to protect residents from the power of the State to surreptitiously intrude 
upon and record their lives, was eliminated for many residents in order to save the 
police the time and effort it takes to show wiretapping is really necessary. 
The efficacy of this avenue to authorize wiretaps was not lost on the police. Be-
tween 2006 and 2010, from a total of 553 wiretap requests, the police made 97 
requests to wiretap target(s) contributing to a criminal organization, 90 for com-
mission of an offence in relation to a criminal organization and 44 for instructing 
the commission of an offence for the benefit of a criminal organization.56 In com-
bination with the (at least) 22 authorizations granted for terrorism-related 
offences,57 it is clear that the privacy protection provided by investigative necessity 
has been significantly diminished, thus exposing residents to an increased risk of 
large-scale privacy violations in the name of State criminal investigation. This find-
ing represents the first indicator that investigative necessity does not play a 
significant role in Canadian wiretap law. The application of investigative necessity 
(in cases where it still applies) is the second, and much more concerning, indicator 
                                                                                                                                                         
51 Ibid. 
52 R v Venneri, 2012 SCC 33 at paras 28-31, 35. 
53 Even s 467.12 of the Criminal Code, supra note 1, which bears a higher stigma than s 467.11, does not 
require membership in the criminal organization to meet the actus reus of the offence: Venneri, supra 
note 53 at para 51. 
54 House of Commons Debates, 35th Parl, 2nd Sess, (21 April 1997) at 9976 [House Debates]. 
55 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
56 2010 Report, supra note 2 at 11. It should be cautioned that most surveillance authorizations are 
granted in relation to more than one offence, so there was likely overlap in the number of individual 
wiretaps authorized under this statutory exception. 
57 Ibid at 8-9. 
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that investigative necessity no longer has a significant role and thus is not effective-
ly balancing investigative and privacy interests. 
III. The Legacy of Araujo: Investigative Necessity as Applied by the Courts 
Investigative necessity is applied by the courts in two different contexts. First, it 
is applied during the initial ex parte hearing to determine if a wiretap will be au-
thorized or renewed. Second, it can be applied by a reviewing judge in a voir dire to 
determine the admissibility of wiretap evidence. At both of these levels, statistics 
and jurisprudence show that investigative necessity plays a very small role in limit-
ing the authorization of wiretaps or the use of wiretap evidence at trial. 
A.  Initial Wiretap Authorizations 
Statistics from the ten years following Araujo are so stark that they suggest ju-
dicial rubber-stamping of wiretap requests remains the norm. From 2001 to 2005, 
two of 689 wiretap authorization or renewal requests were denied.58 Between 2006 
and 2010, two of 553 requests were denied.59 In 2011, zero of 116 were denied.60 
Skeptics would argue that these chilling statistics are justifiable because wire-
taps improve the ability of the State to both investigate and prosecute crime. 
However, the figures show that prosecution of cases involving wiretaps is far from 
a successful endeavour despite courts’ almost universal admission of wiretap evi-
dence.61 While the 551 successful wiretap requests between 2006 and 2010 resulted 
in the arrest of 2617 people whose identities became known as a result of the wire-
tap,62 only 453 (17.3%) were convicted.63 Proceedings were pursued against at least 
2126 of those individuals.64 From that conservative estimate of the total individuals 
against whom proceedings were commenced, only 21.3% were convicted. Of par-
ticular concern is the fact that in 2009 and 2010, only 22 of 502 people arrested 
(4.4%) were successfully convicted.65 In 2011, 294 people whose identity became 
known from an interception were arrested.66 Proceedings were pursued against at 
                                                                                                                                                         
58 2005 Report, supra note 2. Of those 689, 70 were for s 467.11, 46 for 467.12, and 41 for 467.13, all of 
which do not require proof of investigative necessity. Another 91 were for either video or emergency 
audio wiretaps, neither of which requires the affiant to establish investigative necessity. 
59 2010 Report, supra note 2 at 5-6. One hundred twenty-seven of the requests in this range were for 
either video or emergency audio wiretaps. 
60 2011 Report, supra note 2. Thirty-five of this total were for video surveillance. 
61 See Part III.B for detailed discussion. 
62 2010 Report, supra note 2 at 13. 
63 Ibid at 16. 
64 2010 Report, supra note 2 at 14-15. The term ‘at least’ is used due to the nature of the data available. 
The reports divide the persons against whom proceedings were commenced between those persons who 
were identified and not identified in the authorization. Within each of those two categories, the reports 
divide between people charged with (i) an offence specified in the authorization; (ii) and offence for 
which an authorization may be given, but was not specified in the authorization; and (iii) an offence for 
which no authorization may be given. The total of 2126 individuals is the sum of only those people 
charged with an offence specified in the authorization. In other words, that number assumes that all 
people charged with an offence in category (ii) or (iii) were also charged with an offence specified in the 
authorization. It is the most conservative figure at which one could arrive.  
65 Ibid. 
66 2011 Report, supra note 2 at 13. 
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least 234.67 Zero had been convicted by the time Public Safety Canada released its 
2011 Annual Report.68 These figures are nearly 50% below the Public Prosecution 
Service of Canada’s 2008 conviction rate of 69.4%.69 
While alarming, these numbers cannot simply be taken at face value. The dis-
crepancy could at least in part be explained by the fact that wiretaps are often used 
on complex cases which are more difficult to prove in court. However, an over 50% 
gap certainly suggests that the benefit wiretaps provide through crime investiga-
tion, prevention and prosecution is at least more limited than one would assume, 
thus diminishing the utility of the large-scale invasion of privacy. 
The statistics above suggest that the courts may not be applying investigative 
necessity robustly during first instance ex parte wiretap authorizations. In fact, the 
statistics suggest the possibility that the entire wiretap authorization process may 
be an illusory protection of privacy interests. In addition, the benefit police and 
prosecutors gain from the use of wiretaps is significantly smaller than one would 
assume. 
This insignificance of investigative necessity is mirrored in the review of au-
thorizations by trial judges. In fact, other rules concerning the review of wiretaps 
and admission of evidence obtained in breach of the Charter actually further di-
minish the significance of investigative necessity, even when courts suspect or ex-
explicitly find that it has not been proven. The result is that investigative necessity 
is a nearly meaningless protection after the initial wiretap authorization is granted. 
B.  Review of Authorizations at Trial 
On review, investigative necessity has proven to be at least as insignificant as it 
is in initial authorizations. Out of approximately 75 cases decided after Araujo that 
were reviewed, four final decisions found a failure to meet investigative necessity.70 
Of those four, illegally obtained wiretap evidence was admitted in two because of 
the subsequent Charter subsection 24(2) analysis under Grant71 and Collins.72 Only 
one reported case resulted in the exclusion of evidence.73 These statistics alone sug-
gest that investigative necessity is not serving its role protecting Canadians’ privacy 
from unnecessary wiretap surveillance. 
                                                                                                                                                         
67 Ibid at 14-15. 
68 Ibid at 16-17. 2011 figures should be viewed cautiously as many trials may not have concluded by the 
time of writing. 
69 Hong Kong, Legislative Council Secretariat, Conviction Rates in Selected Places at 2, online: 
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/sec/library/0910in19-e.pdf>. The PPSC’s conviction rate is 
not a perfect comparison to the wiretap conviction rate since crimes under the jurisdiction of provincial 
Attorneys General may involve wiretaps. It is, however, an acceptable approximation due to the use of 
wiretaps predominantly in drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime cases, all of which are under 
federal jurisdiction. 
70 Spackman, supra note 17; R v Eatmon (Charter Application), 2007 NBQB 204 [Eatmon]; R v Fraser, 
2010 BCSC 344 [Fraser IN]; R v Terezakis, 2005 BCSC 821 [Terezakis Application]. 
71 R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 [Grant]; wiretap admitted in R v Fraser, 2010 BCSC 1238 [Fraser Charter]. 
72 R v Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265; wiretap admitted in Eatmon, supra note 71. 
73 Spackman, supra note 17. In that case, the Charter admissibility was determined under the Collins test, 
which was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada in Grant, supra note 72. The Char-
ter analysis from the fourth case was unreported. 
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B1.  Legal Barriers 
The parameters under which a trial judge must operate when reviewing a wire-
tap authorization all but ensure wiretap evidence will be admitted. First, the trial 
judge has the discretion to allow the Crown to amplify the police affidavit by pre-
senting evidence in order to buttress a defective warrant.74 This practice was 
expressly maintained, though limited, by Araujo. The Court in Araujo cautioned 
that “amplification cannot go so far as to remove the requirement that the police 
make their case to the issuing judge, thereby turning the authorization procedure 
into a sham.”75 Though Araujo greatly restricted the Crown’s ability to amplify the 
basis for a search warrant and cautioned the courts to be careful not to allow ampli-
fication to subvert the requirement for prior authorization,76 the sheer 
maintenance of amplification to some extent lets the Crown, in those circumstanc-
es where it applies, “attempt to explain away the illegality of the actions of the 
police by way of amplification.”77 It is another mechanism which diminishes the 
significance of a failure to show investigative necessity in an initial request hearing. 
Second, the trial judge is prohibited from conducting a de novo review of the 
authorizing judge’s decision. R v Garofoli established that the reviewing judge may 
only find that a statutory requirement was not met if the authorizing judge “could 
not have granted the authorization” based on the record before them as amplified.78 
Thus, in addition to modifying the initial record through amplification, the trial 
judge must give deference to the authorizing judge’s decision from a hearing in 
which only one side was represented.79 This standard of review only further de-
creases the likelihood that a reviewing court will determine investigative necessity 
was not met, much less exclude evidence. 
Finally, as noted, if the trial judge finds that investigative necessity was not met, 
he or she still must undergo a subsection 24(2) Charter analysis to determine if the 
evidence should actually be excluded. It is by no means guaranteed that the evi-
dence will be excluded either, as only one case of those surveyed actually resulted in 
the exclusion of wiretap evidence.80  
Each of the above successive barriers makes it increasingly less likely that im-
properly obtained wiretap evidence will be excluded at trial. These barriers ensure 
that investigative necessity carries very little practical significance to exclude wire-
tap evidence at the review stage of analysis even if it was not established at the 
initial wiretap request hearing. However, the jurisprudence also shows a deeper 
                                                                                                                                                         
74 Glen Luther, “Of Excision, Amplification and Standing: Making Sense of the Law of Evidence in the 
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plify the affidavit before the trial judge, but this is a normal practice, as the trial is usually the first time 
at which the defence can argue against the sufficiency of information to authorize a wiretap authoriza-
tion. In addition, unconstitutionally or erroneously obtained information may be excised from the 
record based on the accused’s amplification of the record. These errors, too, do not vitiate the authoriza-
tion. Paris, supra note 27 at para 8. 
75 Araujo, supra note 20 at para 59. 
76 Luther, supra note 74 at 3. 
77 Ibid at 4-5. 
78 R v Garofoli, [1990] 2 SCR 1421 at 1452 [emphasis added].  
79 See for example R v Blizzard, 2003 NBQB 420 at para 13; R v Valentine, 2009 CarswellOnt 8868 at 
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concern. A practice of deference to the police has developed which results in find-
ings that investigative necessity is met essentially on the word of the requesting 
officer(s) or their agent both at ex parte hearings and on review. 
B2. Application of Investigative Necessity in Reasons 
Deference to the police has primarily manifested itself in wiretap case law in 
two ways.81 Both have the capability to mislead judges to believe that there are no 
reasonable alternative methods of investigation remaining when other reasonable 
methods exist. 
First, in most cases, broad investigative objectives allowed the police to success-
fully argue wiretaps were the only reasonable method of investigation available. 
Generally, so long as there were reasonable and probable grounds the targeted in-
dividual(s) were involved in the alleged offence(s) with other people, investigative 
necessity was found to be met.82 For example, a defence argument that police 
should have inserted an undercover officer before seeking a wiretap was rejected in 
multiple cases because the undercover officer could not discover the full range of 
associates in a drug trafficking ring that would be found with a wiretap.83 Even 
when a police officer had been highly successful in infiltrating a drug ring as an 
undercover agent, the breadth of the objective to uncover other parties involved in 
the ring was sufficient to meet investigative necessity.84 
This kind of deference has led to acceptance of requesting affidavits that on 
their face do not meet the plain meaning of investigative necessity. In R v Ahmed, 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a decision that investigative necessity 
was met in a case where an undercover operation was proceeding well.85 The affi-
davit filed in support of the authorization request stated: 
Notwithstanding that the undercover operation component of this investi-
gation is proceeding favourably at this time, I believe there is a 
requirement for a full Authorization to intercept private communica-
tions because a crucial component of the undercover operation is the 
relationship the undercover operator has with the targets of the investi-
gation. I believe the targets will usually speak to associates about their 
relationship with the undercover operators, often times making com-
ments which clearly demonstrate how the targets view the undercover 
operators. This information is extremely valuable to personnel planning 
and directing the undercover operation as it allows them to accurately 
                                                                                                                                                         
81 In order to determine trends in the case law, approximately 75 cases from across Canada were sur-
veyed. 
82 In fact, one of the only cases in which a broad objective was rejected is Spackman. That case con-
cerned a single murder involving two accused. The Crown theory that the investigation concerning 
conspiracy to commit the murder would require a more complex understanding of the roles played by 
each of the two parties (by listening to their communications with third parties) was rejected: Spack-
man, supra note 17 at para 39. As there were only two people suspected to be involved in the offence, 
the broad investigative objective argument failed. 
83 Adam, supra note 29 at paras 137-140. Also see Wasfi, supra note 30 at para 34; R v Courtoreille, 2004 
BCSC 834; R v Ciancio and Lees, 2006 BCSC 1717; R v Pham, 2009 CanLII 60792 (Ont SCJ) [Pham 
Ontario]; R v Alcantara, 2011 ABQB 719; R v Sanghera, 2012 BCSC 1197. 
84 R v Williams, 2003 CanLII 18484 at paras 7-9 (Ont CA).  
85 R v Ahmed, 2011 BCCA 254. 
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assess the state of mind of the target, to plan future scenarios to address 
the credibility concerns and also to get advance warning if there are 
concerns for the safety of the undercover operator. Furthermore, it pro-
vides the best evidence at trial should the accused put forth a defence he 
was aware the undercover operators were police officers.86  
The affidavit essentially argues that a wiretap is requested to support an already 
successful, ongoing undercover operation. Rather than demonstrate there is no 
other reasonable alternative tactic, the RCMP showed exactly how another tactic 
was succeeding, and requested a wiretap in support of it. The Court of Appeal held 
that investigative necessity was met because other procedures alone were unlikely 
to provide the full extent of activities of the target and his associates.87 
The case law shows that a broad investigative objective can effectively eliminate 
the viability of any investigative tactic other than a wiretap in the eyes of the courts. 
By pleading that such an objective is the purpose of a wiretap, the requesting or-
ganization will likely not have to meaningfully justify the need for a wiretap when 
other aspects of an investigation are proceeding well. 
Second, even if a broad objective does not eliminate all other alternative meth-
ods of investigation, judges have demonstrated a willingness to defer to the opinion 
of the requesting police officer if it is at all supported by a reason. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal in R v Paris endorsed this statement from an Ontario High Court 
judgment:  
I think that on such an application the judge would be entitled, if he or 
she saw fit to do so, to place considerable weight on the police officer’s 
opinions as to the probable success of various types of possible investi-
gative procedures in different types of cases. I hazard the view that police 
officers probably know more about such matters than most judges.88 
Acceptance of a police officer’s opinion is certainly not always improper. The prob-
lem is not with a properly weighed decision to rely on a police officer’s evaluation 
of whether an investigative tactic would be effective, but rather how often the 
courts have seen fit to place significant weight on an officer’s stated opinion. The 
risk that judges will have their role as the trier of fact usurped to some degree is no 
different from the risk associated with expert evidence.89 A trier of fact is more like-
ly to accept an expert’s opinion than inquire into a technical area about which they 
know little. That is why the admission of expert evidence is limited in other areas of 
law. The police are experts in the investigation of crime. The risk of the expert 
usurping the trier’s role is equally real in wiretap law as it is in any other areas in 
which an expert testifies. Reliance on police opinion risks shifting the analysis from 
the reasonableness of alternative methods of investigation to the believability of 
police reasons, a standard that is much easier for the requesting body to meet. 
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87 Ibid at para 32. 
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This concern is brought to life by the case law. In R v Pham,90 the trial judge ac-
cepted a police officer’s assertion that surveillance of non-public parts of an airport 
was not a reasonable alternative because all airport workers, including those in-
volved in a drug trafficking ring, knew exactly who was supposed to be on shift at 
any given time.91 The judge also accepted the assertion that search warrants of 
known parties to the offence against whom the police had reasonable and probable 
grounds to search would not have yielded information about the leaders of the or-
ganization even though one of those leaders’ property could be searched.92  
In R v Schreinert, similar faith was placed in police opinion. In Schreinert, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a wiretap authorization despite the fact that police 
(i) did not attempt to infiltrate a drug ring, (ii) did not attempt to obtain a search 
warrant for a suspected drug dealer with whom the accused had dealings, (iii) un-
dertook minimal surveillance of relevant locations, (iv) declined to plant an 
undercover agent in the organization because it would take too much time, and (v) 
declined to seek cooperation from another police service that could have assisted in 
the investigation “for political reasons.”93  
The only end to this deference to police opinion came when police either (i) 
gave the Court no reason to believe an investigative method would be unlikely to 
succeed, (ii) inexplicably chose not to undertake common sense elements of police 
investigation or (iii) acted in bad faith. In R v Fraser, the police simply made con-
clusory statements that there were no police agents in the targeted organization nor 
was it likely that either of two informants within the group would be able to intro-
duce an undercover operator.94 Thus, there was nothing the Court could believe to 
explain why these were not reasonable alternative methods. In R v Spackman, the 
police inexplicably decided not to undertake a search of the accused’s vehicle to 
which he consented, and chose not to interview relevant witnesses providing no 
reason for the conduct.95 In R v Eatmon and R v Terezakis, a police officer went 
even further and actually hid information from either the wiretap requesting of-
ficer or the authorizing judge,96 thus clearly demonstrating bad faith. In all of these 
cases, there was no factually viable explanation for the reviewing judge to believe. 
These were the only four of approximately 75 wiretap review cases surveyed in 
which a court did not uphold an initial finding that investigative necessity was met. 
In many other cases surveyed, unnecessary deference to police investigative ex-
perience effectively lowered the investigative necessity requirement from “no 
reasonable alternative forms of investigation” to “no believable reasons provided”97 
                                                                                                                                                         
90 Pham Ontario, supra note 85. 
91 Ibid at paras 68-69. 
92 Ibid at paras 72-75. 
93 Schreinert, supra note 22. 
94 Fraser IN, supra note 71 at paras 61-63. 
95 Spackman, supra note 17 at paras 42-49, 85. 
96 In Eatmon, an officer effectively hid the fact that the accused offered to provide a statement with 
regard to the manslaughter charge with which he was associated (Eatmon, supra note 71 at paras 82-83, 
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Application, supra note 71 at para 43). 
97 In this case, a broad investigative objective is another form of reason justifying the choice not to use 
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for choosing not to undertake an investigation. The application of investigative 
necessity in this manner both fails to properly apply the Supreme Court of Cana-
da’s reasoning in Araujo and unfairly favours the investigation of crimes over 
privacy. 
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations to Reform Investigative Necessity 
The above analysis shows that investigative necessity gives no more protection 
of privacy now than it did before Araujo. As it was applied, the Supreme Court’s 
call to make investigative necessity more than a “rubber stamp” requirement has 
failed to have a significant effect.  
Investigative necessity need not be proven in a significant percentage of wiretap 
cases (≈20% conservatively) due to subsections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) of the Crimi-
nal Code. Even when it is applied, almost no authorization requests are rejected for 
failure to meet investigative necessity at first instance. Upon review, there are sig-
nificant legal barriers to overcome, such as the Garofoli98 standard of review and 
the court’s decision whether to exclude evidence under subsection 24(2) of the 
Charter, before a court will exclude improperly obtained wiretap evidence. Finally, 
the courts have shown a tendency to defer to police opinions when finding that no 
reasonable alternative methods of investigation exist. 
This series of hurdles has relegated investigative necessity to a position of near 
insignificance with regard to the outcome of wiretap authorization requests and 
cases. At present, investigative necessity barely distinguishes wiretaps from tradi-
tional search authorizations. However, that need not be the case. The issues 
causing the weakness of investigative necessity are primarily in the application (or 
lack thereof) of the standard rather than the formulation of Criminal Code subsec-
tion 186(1)(b) or the test to establish it. Araujo and subsection 186(1)(b) provide 
an effective base upon which to determine whether investigative necessity is estab-
lished. Investigative necessity, if properly applied, can distinguish wiretaps from 
traditional searches and better balance privacy and criminal investigative interests. 
The following proposals would serve to breathe some life back into investigative 
necessity in order that it may serve those two purposes. 
A.  Guidelines and Judicial Education 
The creation of internal memoranda or bulletins to educate judges on current 
police investigative methods would allow the bench to better inquire into the exist-
ence of other reasonable alternative methods of investigation. These memoranda 
would ideally be created by the courts of each province to maintain independence, 
but could alternatively be provided and updated by credible experts whose materi-
als are reviewed or overseen by senior judges with experience in the area. Such 
documents should be confidential, so as to ensure they are not used by criminal 
organizations to structure operations in ways that evade necessary authorizations 
of wiretaps. Information about investigative techniques could also be disseminated 
in forums such as judicial education conferences or less formal judicial education 
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seminars which are commonplace in Canadian courts. Such education materials 
could provide substance to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Araujo by giving 
courts more tools to determine if there are no other reasonable alternative methods 
of investigation. 
As stated in R v Paris, the police know more about investigative methods than 
judges.99 However, judges need a sufficient familiarity with police investigative pro-
cedure and tactics to properly balance Canadians’ privacy interests with State 
investigative interests.100 The proposed memoranda, bulletins and education pro-
grams could provide explanations of current police investigative methodologies 
through academic work and vetted materials from police or former police experts if 
available. As the documents would be kept confidential within the courts, such 
information could be disseminated to the bench without concern about compro-
mising investigative efficacy. Confidentiality would thus ensure that the courts are 
better equipped to determine the issue, and ensure that such information is not 
used to obstruct the police’s investigative duties and objectives. 
The creation of internal memoranda, bulletins and education programs is fun-
damentally important to aid judges hearing initial authorization requests. Given 
the ex parte nature of these hearings, triers of fact must be able to inquire into the 
investigation at a deeper level than would be necessary in an adversarial hearing.  
This kind of administrative solution is superior to other possible solutions like 
calls for the Supreme Court of Canada to review the Garofoli standard of review or 
the admission of evidence under subsection 24(2) of the Charter.101 Updated writ-
ten materials and education programs can be crafted and organized immediately. 
There is no need for the right facts to arise for the Supreme Court to reconsider 
one of its decisions. Issues like the Garofoli standard of review may need to be ad-
dressed down the road, but they are issues that will require further consideration to 
craft a better solution.  
By drafting guidelines and creating education programs, the courts can begin to 
re-establish balance between privacy and state investigation today. Such a reform 
would help to ensure investigative necessity is effectively applied at first instance in 
wiretap request hearings and in reviews at trial or on appeal. 
B.  Repeal of subsections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) of the Criminal Code 
My second proposal lacks the ease and immediate effect of the first, but it is 
equally important. Investigative necessity is the only thing that distinguishes sec-
tion 186 wiretap authorizations from traditional searches. Proof of it justifies the 
increased infringement of privacy that is inherent to wiretaps relative to traditional 
searches of property, which are limited in temporal and geographic scope. It fol-
lows that investigative necessity must be proven in all section 186 wiretap 
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authorization hearings.102 In order for that to occur, subsections 185(1.1) and 
186(1.1) of the Criminal Code103 must be repealed.  
There is no doubt that terrorism and organized crime must be investigated 
thoroughly and effectively by Canadian police. However, proving investigative ne-
cessity for wiretaps does not meaningfully inhibit that ability. A Member of 
Parliament argued to remove the requirement because wiretaps are “almost al-
ways” the last resort in this type of crime.104 It is exactly that fact which is why 
proof of investigative necessity never should have been removed for wiretap re-
quests related to those offences. Organized crime and terrorism investigations are 
the types most likely to meet investigative necessity. Organized criminal and terror-
ist organizations are often tight-knit groups in which it is hard to plant an 
undercover police officer or recruit a police agent; they may employ countersur-
veillance to overcome more traditional forms of investigation; in short, they are 
difficult to investigate.105 Removal of the requirement does not significantly benefit 
the State interest in investigation and prosecution of crime beyond easing the time 
commitment of preparing part of the wiretap authorization or renewal request 
affidavit. Therefore, subsections 185(1.1) and 186(1.1) should be repealed in order 
to recreate a legal distinction between authorizations for wiretaps and traditional 
searches, two investigative tactics which are markedly different in practice. 
C.  Summary 
These two reforms represent modest changes that would allow investigative ne-
cessity to better protect citizens from unnecessary authorization of large-scale 
privacy infringement by the State without significantly interfering with the investi-
gation and prosecution of crimes. Each reform targets the evaluation of 
investigative necessity at the initial hearing by ensuring that the authorizing judge 
has the knowledge, resources and legislative framework available to properly apply 
the investigative necessity test established in Araujo. They also avoid the need to 
make massive jurisprudential changes to legal principles like the Garofoli standard 
of review and exclusion of wiretap evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter. 
Without these initial changes, investigative necessity will be relegated to the realm 
of procedural niceties that lack substantive force. With these changes, the applica-
tion of investigative necessity will make the judge in a wiretap hearing more than a 
“rubber stamp.” 
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103 Supra note 1. 
104 House Debates, supra note 55. 
105 See for example R v Violette, 2009 BCSC 1557 at paras 6-78 for discussion of the complex organiza-
tional structure of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club. 
